Understanding the Persistence of Competitive Authoritarianism in Algeria by Dalia Ghanem, Palgrave Macmillan, hardback, 2022. Pages 206. £82.79

Algeria gained independence from France in 1962 after a “hard-fought” eight-year war against colonial power France. After independence, the government became what the author calls “essentially a military regime,” and the parties and associations that existed pre-independence “were dismantled and all opposition was banned”.

The oppressive regime and fiscal imbalance resulted in riots on October 5, 1988. In 1989, the government embarked on a course of political liberalisation and established a multiparty system. Many Algeria experts maintained that this and a new constitution put the country on the road to democracy. (p 2)

However, the book argues that the government went from “outright authoritarianism” to “competitive authoritarianism,” which Dalia Ghanem says the regime mixes elements of a democracy with authoritarianism.
So how has the Algerian regime survived the many upheavals it faced in 1988, 1992, 2001, 2011 and 2019?

The author explains the five pillars that have sustained the regime.
They are the army, Algeria’s true source of power; the co-option of the opposition; the fragmentation of civil society; the rent distribution, corruption, and patronage; and repression.

Ghanem writes that despite the army’s “tremendous influence, in order for it not to have to govern the country outright, it was necessary for the regime to co-opt the country’s opposition… In co-opting opposition parties, the regime not only sustains itself but also provides itself with a democratic fig leaf.” (p 8)

The book also explores the government’s tactics to “fragment the civil society sector, control its activities, and minimise its activism.”

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) lack financial and material resources and so depend on funding from the state and so are “vulnerable to the government’s tactics, which include co-option, litigation, marginalization, scapegoating, and coercion… and so are unable to challenge the government’s policies and actions.” (p 9)

So the author argues that this strategy worked. “One after the other, the regimes of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya fell. Yet Algeria’s remained standing.” (p 5)

“The regime’s primary decision-makers comprise the army, the National Liberation Front (FLN), and increasingly the Democratic National Rally, or RND, and the country’s coastal elites.”

Until 1992, the army consistently manipulated the political arena from behind the scenes. In 1992, it intervened to scrap parliamentary elections that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS is abbreviation for its French name Front Islamique du Salut,) was poised to win. The army arrested thousands of party members.

Again in 2019, the Army intervened to oust Bouteflika, “whom a growing national protest movement vehemently opposed, before once again retreating into the background.” (p 14)

The book gives a deep historical and political insight into the functioning of the authoritarian Algerian government and how it has managed to survive since independence despite huge challenges. The book is an easy read and should be a reference work on how Algeria survived the upheavals in the region. The only drawback is that it does not have an index.

Abdul Adil